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child would be minus parental care. It was the opinion of the
Pennsylvania court that one may, under certain circumstances,
impose conditions or limitations as to employment and yet be
"available" within the meaning of that state's compensation statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801 (d) (1952).
The instant case and Kut v. Aibers, supra, appear to be the
only two cases reaching a high appellate level that deal with offense to one's religious beliefs as the subject of unemployment
insurance suits. However, the principles contended for here

transcend this field and have achieved importance in other types
of actions. To what extent is religious freedom restricted by legislation? In Otten v. B.&O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953), the
railroad and the union entered into a union shop contract pursuant

to legislation, compelling all the employees to join the union or be
discharged. The plaintiff, whose religion forbade his belonging to

a union, contended that his religious liberty was infringed, but
the federal court, 205 F.2d at 61, ruled that the contract did not
violate the constitutional guaranty:
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government, though even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one
the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities .... We must
accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the
compromises necessary in communal life ....

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that religious beliefs will not in all instances excuse non-compliance with statutory regulations. The claim of Miss Tary, at least as far as unemployment claims go, may establish a trend towards allowing
personal beliefs made in good faith to excuse refusal of employment deemed suitable by all other standards. Danger to one's
morals is a subjective problem, and it is important to note that
this discussion has been confined to the reaction of the courts.
If the decision in the principal case is followed in the future in
similar circumstances, it will be incumbent upon the courts and
originally upon the various boards of review to determine
whether the claimant is asserting his personal belief in good faith
or whether he is merely using some caprice in rejecting new employment.
Patrick J. Foley
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THE ART OF ADVOCACY. By Lloyd Paul Stryker.' New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1954. Pp. xiii, 306. $5.00. CASES nT COURT.
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By Patrick Hastings. 2 London: William Heineman, Ltd., 1949,
Reprint 1950, 1953. Pp. xv, 342. $2.95--"If a man goes into the
law, it pays to be the master of it." This is the advice of Mr. Justice Holmes in his famous address, "The Path of the Law." It
could be paraphrased, "If a lawyer takes up advocacy it pays to
be the master of it", to epitomize these two books about the
trial lawyer. The Art of Advocacy by a noted American lawyer
and Cases in Court by a famous English barrister have other
things in common though they are different in style and approach.
Both books emphasize the prime importance of a complete
knowledge of the facts of the case and a thorough preparation
before the trial. They both demonstrate the effectiveness of
skillful cross-examination and each author in his own way pays
high tribute to the art of advocacy.
Sir Patrick Hastings' book is autobiographic and consists principally of the highlights of twenty-one trials in which he participated. It seems he was on the losing side in only a few of them.
Whether this high percentage of wins is typical of his whole
practice is not known, but even so, he must have chalked up a
remarkable record. The principal facts of each case are interestingly told. The court room episodes are depicted dramatically
and there is no waste of words.
In the final chapter Sir Patrick states that one of the qualities
of an advocate, if he is to be successful, is to have the ability "to
seize the one vital element which is to be found in any case."3 The
previous chapters demonstrate that he himself possessed this
ability to a high degree. Many of the cases he talks about were
won by a single or, at the most, a few critical questions during the
cross-examination of a principal witness. There is no doubt a
central fact situation in nearly every case on which the result
turns, but not every case is susceptible of being won by a coupe
de maitre during cross-examination. This, of course, is not Sir
Patrick's thesis. It seems, however, that he was fortunate in having many cases of this kind and that he was skillful enough to
detect the key point in each case and to take full advantage of it.
Mr. Stryker's book grew out of a series of lectures he delivered
at the Yale Law School during the winter of 1952-1953. It is not
a text-book on how to become a skillful advocate; yet it contains
I Member of the New York Bar and the American Bar Association.
Author of For The Defense, Thomas Erskine, Courts and Doctors, Andrew
Johnson, A Study in Courage, and also numerous articles in various law
journals.
2 Member of the Queens Bench and the Temple Bar.
3 Cases in Court, p. 333.
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many useful suggestions to both the young and the older lawyer.
Its primary aim seems first, to serve as a panegyric to the art of
advocacy underlining its importance in the workings of our legal
system, and second, to plead for a return to better advocacy in
our American courts.
The author says that advocacy has fallen into neglect. He deplores the lack of stressing its study in our law schools. Without
wanting to detract from the argument Mr. Stryker makes on this
point, it should be noted that many law schools presently provide
practice court courses and that most of them have moot court
competition which has extended during recent years into the
intercollegiate field. There also has been an increase of trial
technique institutes and books on trial practice sponsored by bar
associations.
Another suggestion for better advocacy offered by Mr. Stryker
is a divided bar patterned after the English system.4 It seems
doubtful if this suggestion will gain much favor at the present
time. Tradition and habit will discourage such a radical change.
On the other hand the author's views are persuasive and perhaps his ideas are being realized more than we think. While
there is no sharp division in this country between the solicitor and
the barrister, and there probably never will be, the important
trial work seems to be becoming more concentrated in the hands
of those who specialize in trial practice. This is particularly true
in the metropolitan.areas.
The Art of Advocacy as a whole is an entertaining and instructive book. The sketches of some of the great advocates, past and
present, are inspiring. One minor fault is its verboseness in spots.
The book is directed, but not wholly, to the legal profession.
It should be required reading for law students. While many law.
students will not become advocates and perhaps only a few
masters of the art, the book should prove helpful to those who
do aspire in that direction. It may also serve in aiding self-elimination of those who find they should engage in some other
phase of the practice.
To all, and to the legal profession in particular, it will serve
as a challenging reminder of the Bar's responsibilities to promote
honorable and effective advocacy, and more important, to stand
by the side of the honest advocate who may be subjected to public criticism and attack for representing an unpopular defendant
in a criminal trial. Those responsibilities involve not only the
Bar's independence and integrity, but also its vital role in maintaining our judicatory institutions. In the words of Sir Patrick
Hastings, "Perhaps it is only necessary to watch a litigant in
4

The Art of Advocacy, Chap. XIII.
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person trying to conduct his own case unaided, floundering
through a mass of evidence, quite unable to express the simplest
point in such a way that anyone can understand it, in order to
realize at once that trained advocacy is an absolute necessity to
justice; without the advocate Law as we understand it could not
5

survive."I

Luther N. Swygert*

PHmIosopHy OF LAW. By Giorgio Del Vecchio.' Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1953. Pp. 474.
$6.50.-The foreword to this volume is from the pen of Dr.
Brendan Brown, Prof. of Law, Loyola University, himself an
authority in the field of law and philosophy of law. The foreword
itself contains a commentary and criticism of Del Vecchio's work
and is alone worth the price of the book. It is no exaggeration
to name the book a work of genius. We are fortunate to have the
translation written in the style and beauty that the original
possesses without loss of the clarity of Del Vecchio's masterpiece.2
In the author's introduction, philosophy of law is distinguished
from the science of law. Philosophy of law is a part of philosophy
and a part of practical philosophy, treating of principles of operaation. Practical philosophy is divided into Moral Philosophy and
Philosophy of Law. (Del Vecchio does not mention philosophy
of art as a division of practical philosophy.)
The study of law in a universal sense constitutes the object
of philosophy of law. Juridical science or Jurisprudence has
for its object particular points of law, the individual systems of
law, considered separately for each people at a given period;
for example, Roman Law, Italian Law, German Law, etc. Furthermore, Juridical Science does not, properly speaking, consider a system in its entirety. It proceeds to further specifications
and distinctions, considering a particular part of that system
(Public or Private Law) then more particularly as branches of
Public Law: Constitutional, Administrative, etc.
The three fields of research in philosophy of law: the logical,
the phenomeno-logical, and the deontological must be considered.
With respect to the first field, the logical, it is clear that no
particular juridical science can tell us sic et simpliciter what is
law in the universal sense. It can only tell us what is the law
Judge of the United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana.
1 Professor of Legal Philosophy, University of Rome, formerly Dean
of the Faculty of Jurisprudence and also Rector of the University of Rome.
2
Translated by Thomas Owen Martin, from the eighth edition (1952) of
Lezioni di Filosofta del Diritto.
*
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among a certain people in a given period. The definition of law
in general requires an investigation which transcends the competence of each individual juridical science. It is the first task
of philosophy of law to investigate the logical essentials of law,
the elements which are common to all law, law in its logical
entirety The definition of such a concept implies the presence
of several investigations on the relationships between Morals
and Law, on the distinctions of the various aspects or phases
which constitute the Law (subjective and objective) and even
many other concepts which permeate or are connected with that
Law, for example, that of power to coerce.
In the historical part of his book, Del Vecchio outlines succinctly the philosophical notions of law by the early Greeks, the
Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics; the Roman Jurists,
Christian philosophers in the Middle Ages; the Patristic period,
Scholasticism, the Rennaissance, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Puffendorf, Locke, Leibnitz, Thomasius, Wolff, Vico, Montesquieu,
Rousseau and others. Considerable weight is given to Kant, Fichte
and the Law of Reason School. Turning to modern philosophers
of law, he enumerates a host of writers on law in Italy, France,
Belgium, England, Spain, Portugal, Latin America, the United
States.
The systematic study of the philosophy of law occupies the
second part of the book from page 244 to the end. This second
part is divided into three sections, one entitled the Concept of
Law and the second, Origin and Historical Evolution of Law.
The third section concerns the Rational Foundation of Law.
What may be considered as Del Vecchio's most interesting insights are to be found in the last section where he locates the
foundation of law in human nature. Here he demolishes modern
positivism, his chief antagonist, which errs in denying natural law.
Since the foreward to this great work suitably corrects what
is faulty in Del Vecchio's analysis of the fundamental, logical
form of law, it is noteworthy that we assess the volume under
consideration in its duel construction, combining the brilliant
foreword of Dr. Brown's composition with the monumental study
by Del Vecchio. It is then impossible to overestimate the value
of the book for classroom study.
The time is 1954. The day of cold war is now far spent, unless
the high-priests of positivism are unmasked so that we may
reform the ranks of all students of nature and nature's God.
There is much good to be accomplished by instruction given by
erudite scholars like the jurist at the University of Rome. For
he shows clearly that man finds his greatest perfection, dignity
and happiness in reasonable activity. Law itself is concerned
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with the regulation of operations; it is not something foreign
to reason. It is the function of reason to order action and fashion
law.
The points of similarity among Neo-Kantians such as Del
Vecchio are many and pedagogically all-important There agreement that law is a priori and that law and morals have their
own proper sanctions needs to be emphasized. The champions of
inalienable rights and defenders of true democracy against totalitarian governments by men need to close ranks. Del Vecchio
has given us new courage and hope that all is not as yet lost in
the battle for the minds of youth.
William' F. Roemer*
WARREN'S FoRMs OF AGREEMENTs. By Oscar LeRoy Warren.'
Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, 1954. Pp. vii, 1460. $20.00.
-Ir.
Warren, editor of the highly successful Bender's Forms for
the Civil Practice Acts, and Bender's Forms of Pleading, has
produced an excellent one volume business contract form book.
The forms, dealing with contracts used in ordinary business
transactions, are derived from reported decisions where they
have been tested by the courts and from forms in actual use in
various business enterprises. By substituting references to
Corpus Juris, Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence for the customary annotations to state decisions, the editor
has been able to include in a conveniently sized volume many
more forms than the average single volume work. The
loose-leaf feature of the book with improved lock makes it possible to keep forms up to date and to insert from time to time the
lawyer's own notes and variations of the forms suggested in an
easily accessible place.
Each section commences with a brief discussion on the general
requirements of the type of contract involved. Then the general
form is given followed by additional clauses suggested for other
peculiar needs or circumstances. A valuable check list helps not
only the draftsman himself, but also the counsel asked to pass on
the sufficiency of a contract presented to him.
Many of the forms Mr. Warren suggests show an admirable
balance between the modern "stream-lined" contract and the
older documents with their "wealth of recitals." The confusing
"party of the first part", "party of the second part", etc. may well
be dispensed with today in the interests of clarity and simplicity in many cases, but the reported decisions show that the
full and detailed recitals of the old forms have still their value.

*

Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame.
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Another excellence of Mr. Warren's volume is that it "allows
for some play in the joints." No form book, however carefully
and exhaustively edited, can come up with all the tested phrases
the contract draftsman will need to meet the hundreds. of special circumstances he will face. A forn-Abook can never take the
place of the draftsman's imagination. Mr. Warren's forms are
not for legal stenographers or secretaries, but for lawyers.
In the practice of law this reviewer has had occasion to refer
to many types of form books. Mr. Warren's can be recommended
to the profession as one of the best from the standpoint of careful
editing, comprehensiveness, and, most important of all, common
sense.
Edward F. Barrett*

1 Editor of WAmies, NEGLIGENCE IN THE NEw Yoan Comrrs and many
other legal works.
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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